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Towards Effective Cybersecurity Resource 
Allocation: The Monte Carlo Predictive Modelling 
Approach 
Abstract: Organisations invest in technical and procedural capabilities to ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information assets and sustain business 
continuity at all times. However, given growing productive assets and limited protective 
security budgets, there is a need for deliberate evaluation of information security 
investment. Optimal resource allocation to security is often affected by intrinsically 
uncertain variables and associated factors like technical, economical and psychological; 
therefore, security expenditure is a crucial resource allocation decision. In spite of that, 
security managers and business owners are often incentivised by different drivers on 
whether to allocate optimal resources to cyber-specific security protective assets or other 
business productive assets. Hence, there is a disparity of opinion in resource allocation 
decisions. We explored how Monte Carlo predictive simulation model can be used within 
the context of Information Technology to reduce these disparities. Using a conceptual 
enterprise as a case study and verifiable historical cost of security breaches as parametric 
values, our model shows why using conventional risk assessment approach as budgeting 
process can result in significant over/under allocation of resources for cyber capabilities. 
Our model can serve as a benchmark for policy and decision support to aid stakeholders in 
optimising resource allocation for cyber security investments. 
Keywords: Information Security, risk assessment, Resource allocation, Monte-Carlo 
simulation, Security investment decision. 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
 
There are a lot of fundamental issues associated with risk 
evaluation, reporting and mitigation costs in IT security 
domain. The problem of cyber security risks management in 
corporate organisations is non-trivial, hence, constructing 
tools that truly satisfy risk measurement theory is difficult 
and not readily available [1]. Information security is 
fundamentally concerned with the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of information assets at all times. In order to 
defend against threats to information assets, organisations 
invest in countermeasures, however, as the number of assets 
to be protected grows and IT budgets are constrained, there 
is a need for deliberate evaluation of information security 
investments [3]. Cyber security is one of the biggest 
challenges facing businesses in recent time. Economic loss 
due to cyber-attack is on the increase and many businesses 
have been obliterated due to loss of intellectual assets to 
cyber criminals. This figure is set to grow exponentially, 
according to the study conducted in [21] which enunciated 
that by 2020, losses from cyber-attack may hit the $20 
Trillion mark. In a different report [26], studies conducted 
to quantify the actual and potential value of losses as a 
result of successful system breaches is put in the region of 
$500 million and $5 billion per year in the United States 
alone. Hence, the importance of risk management cannot be 
overemphasised. As firms’ vulnerability to cyber-attacks 
increases, so is the need for further investment in 
cybersecurity enhancement measures. Security managers 
can effectively reduce the potential and probability of loss 
to cyber rogues by reinforcing firms’ cyber capabilities. 
[22]. 
 
What constitutes Information Security risk, is relative to 
organisation risk acceptance level. However, in all cases, 
security managers’ priority is to mitigate organisational risk 
exposure that could undermine the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of mission-critical systems. Apart from 
huge financial losses, a security breach can lead to sanctions 
from industry regulators, negative corporate image, and loss 
of confidence in clients and customers. A classic example is 
the case of TalkTalk, a UK communication giant that was 
hacked in 2015. Personal details of nearly 157,000 TalkTalk 
customers were accessed through a rudimentary SQL 
Injection attack on the company website. More than 15, 000 
personal account numbers and sort code were also stolen.  
The impact of cyber-attack is reported [27, 28] to have cost 
the company £42m, loss of over 100,000 customers and a 
fine of £400,000 for the data breach by the Information 
Commission Office (ICO). The ICO claimed that hacks 
could have been prevented if TalkTalk had implemented 
basic cyber security measures to safeguard its customers’ 
data.  
   
This work explores how Monte-Carlo simulation model can 
be used for effective cyber security resource allocation. It 
investigates how to make a business case for resource 
allocation decisions within a business enterprise/SMBs.   
Monte Carlo simulations have been extensively used by risk 
analysts in various fields of study to make future risk 
estimations [6]. A simulation approach to managing and 
visualising uncertainties in cyber-security context allows 
different variables to be applied to different risk scenarios, 
for optimal resource allocation to mitigate manage those 
risks. Monte-Carlo simulation can perform quantitative risk 
analysis by assigning a probability distribution to uncertain 
parameters; and through random sampling of the 
distribution, it is possible to determine all potential 
outcomes under those uncertainties [7].  
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows: Section 
2 covers the literature review of related work. We present 
risk management overview in section 3. The background 
description of our predictive modelling approach is covered 
in section 4. Model assumptions, scenario and methodology 
are covered in section 5. We present results and key 
findings in section 6. Conclusion and future work 
implications are covered section 7. 
 
 
2 Related Work 
 
 
There are several works [9, 10, 11, 12], that evaluates the 
budgetary allocation problems of information security 
investments, in an attempt to justify optimum security 
investment decisions.  The work in [25] showed how system 
vulnerability can be reduced through security patches. A 
game-theoretic model was developed to study the strategic 
interaction between a vendor and a firm in balancing the 
costs and benefits of patch management. The approach 
presented by [13] is based on expected utility value of 
investment in order to determine the optimal investment 
amount. The approach suggests that the level of investment 
for asset protection depends on the vulnerability of the asset 
and associated potential losses. The work further assumes 
that with increase information security investment, the 
probability of security breach decreases but the marginal 
improvement on security also decreases with higher 
investment. Hence, risk-averse management may maximise 
the expected utility of a budget to determine the maximum 
amount to invest, which should not exceed the potential loss 
of breach. The approach presented [14], uses the term 
‘Return on Security Investment’ (ROSI), which is similar to 
the traditional accounting figure. The approach incorporates 
one-time costs and benefits of information security while it 
discards running costs and benefits as well as non-financial 
security measures. In order to support investment decisions. 
ROSI is calculated as: 
 
ROSI = ((risk exposure x risk mitigation)-solution costs)/ 
(solution costs). Where: risk exposure=ALE X ARO 
ALE denotes annual loss exposure while ARO denotes the 
annual rate of occurrence. 
 
In a work presented by [15], information security 
investment decision is based on a balanced scorecard 
performance measuring system. This method, in its original 
context, evaluates organisation business performance from 
the angle of financial, customer, internal process and 
innovation. The authors extended and applied balanced 
scorecard method in the context of information technology 
to support management decisions. The approach uses goal 
measurement to establish investment needs. Goal 
importance e.g. server downtime reduction is weighted 
relative to other goals in order to set goal fulfilment 
minimum average degree. If an investment’s average degree 
is considered to be above the threshold, then it is deemed 
economically viable. This approach considers all financial 
and non-financial mitigation measures. 
 
There are other research efforts that also propose Monte 
Carlo simulation for information security. For instance, [18] 
Presents Monte Carlo simulation method for evaluating and 
communicating security investment benefits and to 
understand technology choices in a financial manner. In 
[33], the authors describe probabilistic risk assessment to 
ICT systems, through scenario-based estimation of agent 
attack plan and risk impact. Then applies Monte Carlo for 
detailed simulation of threat agents’ behaviour to support 
assessment through statistical evaluation of risk. Similarly, 
[34] introduces Haruspex to simulate adaptive agents. The 
tool utilises Monte Carlo method to support evidence-based 
risk assessment and management, in furtherance of 
justifying appropriate countermeasures. The work in [35] 
presents a different approach to information security 
assessment based on analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and 
Monte Carlo simulation. In particular, the approach applies 
weight elements to the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information assets in order to improve the 
accuracy of results. The approach presented in [36] 
addresses uncertainty elements in security risk assessment 
and visualisation. It combines system level process through 
risk analysis and probabilistic survivability assessment 
(RAPSA) and expert estimation through Monte Carlo, in 
order to quantify information risks as financial variables. 
 
However, with respect to the related publications, our work 
use the Monte Carlo simulation approach to optimise 
resource allocation for security investment in a different 
perspective. The work discussed in this paper is based on a 
predictive modelling approach and offers a different 
dimension to information security resource allocation 
problems. We applied Monte-Carlo simulation in the 
context of information technology to a single block optimal 
resource allocation at an organisational level. However, the 
way IT divisions prioritise budgets to different security 
capabilities is not included in this work. 
 
 
   
3 Risk Management Overview 
 
 
Information security risks are generally described under the 
broad categorization of disaster or abuse. The top priority of 
Chief Information Officers (CIO) and management are to 
ensure continual functionality of IT resources at critical 
levels of operations. Risk management can be described as a 
systematic and logical approach to identifying, treating, 
analysing and monitoring risks in any process. Managers 
benefit from risk management strategies because it has a 
direct bearing on how available resources are put to best 
use. Risk management is practised in both private and 
public sectors; including health care, government 
establishments, insurance, finance and investments. 
However, in the context of Information Security, risk 
management is about the protection of information assets. 
Information Security Risk Management is defined [29] as 
the protection of information assets from a wide range of 
threats in order to ensure business continuity, manage 
business risk and maximise return on investment. Risk 
management within the context of an organisation involves 
the implementation of appropriate controls to mitigate, 
share, transfer, insure, accept and continually manage risks 
as set out in the ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Standard [31]. The 
ISO/IEC2700 series of standards define best practices, 
baseline requirements and controls for Information Security 
Management Systems (ISMS), under the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability (CIA) triad. In addition, given that 
threat climate changes all the time, it is essential that the 
effectiveness of security controls be periodically reappraised 
by the organisation. This is an important element of risk 
management cycle [30]. There are various reasons why an 
organisation may require some measures of security control 
against potential threats; these could stem from internal 
factors like corporate regulations and organisational policies 
or mandatory external influences like the data protection 
acts or compliance requirements of industry regulators. 
Whatever the driver, it is apparent that risk management 
will involve some mitigation control investments and 
resource allocation decisions. 
However, Information Security professionals often do not 
quantify and communicate risks effectively in order to 
attract the right level of resource allocation. Again, 
organisations may struggle to present a measure of accurate 
cost benefits of information security activities, primarily 
because, security investment results in loss prevention rather 
than profit margins [2]. That is why business executives 
often opt for compliant security, whereby, baseline 
requirements of standards like the ISO2700, NIST etc. are 
implemented, then businesses operate under the assumption 
that compliance equates security. Whereas, this is often not 
the case because baseline controls may be enough for 
industry regulators and business executives but often fail to 
result in holistic protection [32]. The costs associated with 
risk management range from personnel to hardware and 
software outgoings. Therefore, information security 
expenditure is a crucial resource allocation decision, yet 
little is known about the budgeting process used to ensure 
optimal investment in information security capabilities [4], 
or at best, the budgeting process is generally beclouded with 
ambiguities. 
Traditionally, organisations use risk assessment model to 
determine the optimal allocation of resources to cyber 
capabilities. This approach is a flavour of risk-based 
regulation whereby firms determine their security 
investment based on risk assessment, potential losses and 
investment profile [23]. An organisation’s budgetary 
decision is then based on its threat tolerance and its score 
from the risk scoring matrix. Risk scoring matrix is 
calculated on the assumption that an event will happen 
given a probability of occurrence and impact or severity of 
security breaches. Information security budget is then 
allocated based on the resultant estimated risk score. The 
risk scoring formula is given as:   
Risk = Probability (P) X Impact (I) 
The value of (P) and (I) for a given asset is assigned based 
on expert opinion, statistic from reports, corporate level 
assessment or record from past events and the resultant 
single value represents the risk score for that particular 
asset. To suggest that the risk impact to information assets 
are subjective probability estimates is rather ambiguous and 
deterministic.  In practice, it is difficult to apply this 
calculation to real world problems, in order to optimise 
resource allocation decisions. This approach raises the 
question of reliability [5], as risk predictions are 
misrepresented for effective mitigation. Information security 
risk and management is transitory; hence, the actual impact 
of risky events might not be a true reflection of the current 
deterministic estimation.   
 
 
 
 
4 Background Description of our Predictive 
Modelling Approach 
 
 
4.1 Different Approaches to Resource Allocation 
Decision Processes 
 
 
When risk analysis is based on the traditional risk matrix 
approach, security assessors extrapolate that under certain 
assumptions, certain events would be true; while completely 
discarding the possibility of least significant and extreme 
events as part of that extrapolation. For organisations that 
base its threat tolerance on information security risk 
assessment, trying to guess the odd under so many 
uncertainties can only lead to erroneous results. The 
difficulty of this approach is further emphasised in [24], 
where it is stated that effective allocation of resources under 
the circumstance of uncertain risk and severity of breach 
   
cost is very hard. In order to explain how uncertainty affects 
security breach costs and resource allocation decision to 
mitigate those risks, we present a high-level and low-level 
conceptual enterprise scenario for a bank in figure 1 and 
figure 2 respectively.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: High-level conceptual model diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Low-level conceptual model diagram showing key 
asset points 
 
 
We assume that the bank only has 5 high-risk asset points 
that need to be safeguarded from security threats at all 
times. Also, stakeholders’ resource allocation decision is 
based on the severity of breach to those assets and how it 
may impact banking operation. For illustrative purposes, we 
consider DDoS Mitigation System, Personnel and third-
party contractors, Data Backup and Recovery System, 
Incident Response Solution, and Antivirus Software as the 
key asset. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.1 Deterministic Estimation of Security Breach 
Costs 
 
 
This approach is based on the use of conventional risk 
assessment model to determine appropriate resource 
allocation. Deterministic point estimation is associated with 
random variability like a game of chance.  In a roll of a die, 
probabilistically, there is a 1/6 chance that a certain number 
would come up, and it would have an interpretation given 
long-term frequency. Risk/vulnerability output based on 
five scale levels of very low, low, medium, high and very 
high also have the same element of chance. See table 1 for a 
description of likelihood and severity of risk, especially in 
terms of financial impact. Likelihood of risk is ranked on 
the scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is rare or very low and 5 is 
frequent or very high. 
 
 
 
 
Similarly, table 2 shows the risk scoring matrix by taking 
into account the likelihood and severity value of each risk. 
Risk scoring is carried out by applying a simple 
multiplication process whereby the likelihood of risk is 
multiplied by the severity of that risk occurring. After 
scoring each risk, risk rating is then applied by choosing the 
most appropriate definition under likelihood and the most 
appropriate definition under severity, then the numbers are 
Likelihood Description Frequency of 
Occurrences 
1 An incident is expected to 
occur in exceptional 
circumstances, e.g. once 
in 10 years 
Rare/Very Low 
2 An incident may occur at 
some point, e.g. once in 3 
years 
Possible/Low 
3 An incident will 
occasionally recur, e.g. 
once in a year 
Probable/Medium 
4 An incident will occur in 
most circumstances, e.g. 
once every 4 months 
Certain/High 
5 An incident is certain to 
occur in most 
circumstances, e.g. once 
every month 
Frequent/Very 
High 
Severity Description Example of 
Business Impact 
1 None:  no disruption of 
service 
Financial loss < 
£1000  
2 Minor Financial loss < 
£10, 000 
5 Moderate Financial loss < 
£100, 000 
10 Significant Financial loss < 
£1, 000 000 
15 High Financial loss > 
£1, 000 000 
Table 1: Risk likelihood and severity description 
   
looked up in the risk matrix table and matched to obtain the 
risk rating. After the risk analysis phase, given an 
organisation risk threshold and the risk score number, the 
budget is allocated for countermeasures to mitigate risks in 
that context. 
 
The idea of risk assessment is to evaluate scenarios of 
security incidents and take proactive measure before it 
happens. Consider one of our scenario high-risk assets; a 
dedicated DDoS Mitigation System (DMS) that can deter 
DDoS attacks. How effective the DMS is to mitigate 
volumetric attacks may be uncertain but it is unlikely that 
enterprise operations and vital computing resources will be 
subjected to complex layer 7 attacks, in order to ascertain if 
the defence mechanism is worthy of investment. Rather, it is 
more likely that we use historical data to assist with 
resource allocation decisions, but in the absence of data, we 
can use estimations. A risk analyst may make a statement 
that the probability of a successful attack without mitigation 
(the DMS) is 3, and the cost impact in terms of human and 
financial resources needed to recover from the attack is 
($53,477).  
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Risk rating table 
 
 
However, when deterministic point estimate is used to score 
risk and model uncertainties; what that actually mean is that 
based on the subjective estimates for each asset point, the 
total breach cost without security investment for all tangible 
and intangible assets in the enterprise, will always be the 
sum of breach costs to each asset (as shown in table 3).  If it 
is certain that an expert’s deterministic estimate is 100% 
reliable, then potential cost of a security breach should be 
fine, hence resource allocation to mitigate those risks should 
correctly reflect the assessment. In reality, security breach to 
some asset will cost less with insignificant impact while 
some may result in colossal losses with catastrophic 
consequences. Therefore, resource allocation under 
uncertain risk-based assessment is unlikely to match risk 
mitigation efforts. 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2  Probabilistic Estimation of Security Breach 
Costs. 
 
In order to address the huge amount of uncertainties 
associated with deterministic approach, especially in view 
of increasing information assets; we can consider 
probabilistic estimation approach. Through, Monte-Carlo 
simulations, we can determine the probabilistic cost of 
breach for each asset in a given scenario. The Monte Carlo 
simulation works by sampling lots of scenarios from a 
probability distribution instead of static point estimates. 
Probabilistic estimation assigns minimum and maximum 
cost boundaries for each security breach. The combined cost 
of all security breaches is then calculated as the total 
minimum and maximum cost of a security breach for each 
asset in order to project total resource allocation for the 
enterprise. In that case, it is possible to establish absolute 
bounds for allocated resources to the entire enterprise.  
 
Monte Carlo may not be able to tell with certainty the exact 
cost of a breach, but it can describe the probability of cost 
associated with security breaches, to aid resource allocation. 
In comparison to the deterministic approach, the 
probabilistic estimate is also based on random variables, 
however, each estimate follows a particular distribution, 
independent and unaffected by other variables. 
 
 
 
Consider the deterministic cost of breach for the DMS as 
described in the previous sub-section. Under probabilistic 
estimation approach, we can use a smearing out parameter 
to suggest that in place of a fixed quantity like £53,477, we 
could include the minimum value in of $30,000 and the 
maximum value of $65,000 in a distribution, as shown in 
table 4. Essentially, we replace a fixed value with a 
probability distribution, which is a true representation of the 
state in the real world. Hence, the fixed quantity is now our 
most likely value, but it is not the only possible value in the 
distribution. The key to Monte Carlo simulation is that each 
variable is assigned a random value, and the total value is 
calculated thousands of times during the simulation.  It, 
therefore, allows us to understand the risk that expectations 
may not match reality, hence, appropriate precautions can 
be taken [8].  
Average annual cost of security breach in magnitude of 
$K/year 
Assets Security 
Incidents 
 C = Cost of 
breach 
DMS DDoS Attack  53,477 
Personnel & 3rd 
Party 
Malicious Insider  40,403 
Recovery System Data Loss  39,905 
Incidence 
Response 
Cyber  
Espionage 
 69,026 
Anti-Virus 
Software 
Malicious Code 
Infection 
 31,572 
  Total 234,383 
Table 3: Expert estimation of security breach costs 
   
Assets 
Security 
Incidents 
Unit cost of security breach without 
risk mitigation investments (in 
magnitude of $K/year) 
Cmin = 
minimum 
Cml = 
most 
likely 
Cmax = 
maximum 
DDoS 
Mitigation 
System 
Dos/DDoS 
Attack 
30,000 53,477 65,000 
Personnel 
and third 
party 
contractors 
Fraud/Malicious 
Insider  
20,000 40,403 50,000 
Data 
Backup 
and 
Recovery 
System 
Data loss/Stolen 
Devices 
25,000 39,905 45,000 
Incident 
Response 
Solution 
Cyber 
Espionage 
35,000 69,026 75,000 
Antivirus 
Software 
Malicious Code 
Infection 
15,000 31,572 37,000 
Total  123,000 234,383 272,000 
 
Table 4: Model simulation parameters 
 
It is difficult to compute values for multiple scenarios 
without some form of simulation, especially if we have to 
factor in multiple assets and security breach costs, as part of 
the budgetary allocation process. 
 
 
 
 
5 Methodology 
 
There are two basic assumptions for this model: 
 
• Key information asset points are determined by an 
organisation CIO and the security team. 
• Minimum and maximum values of security breach costs 
are subject to expert elicitation, based on experience 
and previous security breach events. 
 
The work described in this paper use some security breach 
cost parametric values obtained from verifiable information 
security breach reports. Model parameters are taken from 
the Ponemon Institute 2015 cost of security breach report 
[16], and Kaspersky Lab IT security risks special report 
series [17]. The study in [16] covered data breach cost and 
impact of 350 organisations around the globe. The study use 
activity-based costing (ABC) for data breach calculation 
which takes into account; direct cost, indirect cost and 
opportunity cost. It also takes into account a range of 
expenditure associated with organisation data breach 
detection, containment, response and remediation. The 
study in [17] covers corporate IT security risks survey of 
more than 5500 companies in 26 countries around the 
world. It covers IT threats and the cost of recovery when a 
security breach occurs. Values taken from both studies serve 
as input parameters for our simulation model as shown in 
table 4. However, limitations of the costing methodology 
outlined in the studies are not validated nor described in this 
work.  
 
We identify uncertain deterministic security breach costs in 
our model and convert them into a range of values using a 
triangle distribution, as shown in figure 3. For each breach 
cost estimate, given an asset, fixed values are replaced with 
a probability distribution. Triangular distribution used in 
this model is one of the most used probability distributions 
to elicit expert opinion, especially in the case of limited or 
absence of historical data. It defines uncertain breach cost 
values as a minimum (Cmin), most-likely (Cml) and 
maximum (Cmax) range of values, for each asset in the 
model calculations.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Schema of the MC predictive model 
 
This approach follows the model implemented in [18], 
whereby the (Cmin) and (Cmax) are held constant while the 
(Cml) is selected randomly from the distribution graph. (Cml) 
are non-negative random variables which follow a triangle 
distribution. For this simulation, we used MATLAB and 
Vose ModelRisk software [19], both tools allow 
configurable simulations with a very large number of runs 
and can generate thousands of scenarios for each set of 
uncertain inputs. ModelRisk uses a mathematical model for 
input variables and triangle distribution function given as: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The simulated output is generated given the mathematical 
relationship with input variables, and the results provide 
predictive indicators to support decision-making processes. 
However, with Monte-Carlo, input variables for the 
simulation model are uncertain, random and defined 
according to a probability distribution in order to capture 
and model those uncertainties. In this model, what happens 
is that thousands of scenarios are generated to reflect a 
probabilistic output for each uncertain input, according to 
triangle distribution, then, the resultant output values are 
computed thousands of times over again during the 
simulation. However, in order to obtain a convergence and 
more realistic values, a recommended run of 10,000 
   
simulations is required, 1000 iterations being the barest 
minimum acceptable [20]. We generate 50,000 simulation 
runs, the model output is a probabilistic range of values and 
scenarios associated with security breach costs, as well as 
the probability distribution associated with those values. 
 
 
 
 
6 Simulation Results and Discussion 
 
Results of Monte Carlo simulation shown in figure 4 add an 
extra dimension to the initial deterministic values. As the 
simulation begins, samples are taken from each of the 
breach cost probability distribution. ModelRisk then 
computes the average random value at the end of each 
iteration. During the simulation, different scenarios are 
generated based on the frequency proportional to the 
probability of those scenarios occurring.  
  
 
 
Figure 4: Simulation result in ModelRisk with cumulative 
overlay 
 
At the end of the simulation, the output histogram represents 
50,000 scenarios for security breach cost. The result of the 
simulation takes into account all uncertainties and it is in the 
form of probability distribution similar to the input 
parameters. These distributions represent possible 
outcomes, rather than single point predicted outcome. 
 
From the model result in figure 4, it can be seen that the 
upper 5% and the lower 5% represents extreme cases that 
are ignored by the simulation output. From the parametric 
values in table 4, it can be seen that the total resource 
allocation could be as low as $123K or as high as $272K, 
but the realistic chance of resource allocation nearing these 
extreme values is very unlikely, hence the model ignored 
them. It can be seen that 90% of the simulation iterations 
fall under a value less than the upper bound estimated total 
values.  Hence, we can say that 90% of the total allocation 
will meet our initial estimate. While this is not a guarantee, 
it allows us to adjust IT security budget to match the cost of 
potential breaches and also understand the risk that resource 
allocation may not meet initial estimates. 
Further analysis of the result in figure 4 shows that given all 
the iteration of simulations, the absolute minimum value of 
$149,794 is much higher than the original deterministic 
lower bound value of $123k. Similarly, the absolute 
maximum probabilistic value of $253k after iteration is 
much lower than the deterministic value of $272k, with only 
5% chance of the allocation going over the upper boundary. 
The most likely point estimate is around the value of $290k; 
from the location of the peak of the distribution, it can be 
seen that this value is rather more realistic than the 
deterministic value of 234,383. However, the cost of impact 
could be significantly higher, possibly twice as high in 
terms of cumulative percentage.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Simulation result in MATLAB showing values for 
Cmin and Cmax 
 
In an attempt to validate our model, we compared the result 
with another simulation in MATLAB shown in figure 5, 
using the same input parametric values. The invariant that 
holds in both states of the models is that extreme values are 
ignored in the output of both simulations.  While both 
models follow a similar distribution, it can be seen that not 
only did both simulations ignore lower and upper bound 
values, but also shows higher Cmin and lower Cmax than the 
deterministic values. This also confirms the correctness of 
the representation entities behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
In general, predictive models allow us to make more useful 
and less erroneous decisions. Making important decisions 
without diligent consideration to uncertainties in the 
budgeting process can lead to unrealistic values. Forecasting 
with accuracy, on how much damage a successful security 
breach can cause is a real challenge for risk managers, 
especially when multiple assets and associated threat 
exposure are considered. Again, three point estimates, for 
all assets tend to become unreliable as the complexity of 
   
asset classes in the model increases. Using probabilistic 
simulation, therefore, simplifies the complexity of cost 
estimation processes. The application of Monte Carlo 
simulation to information security investment decision, in 
particular, allows us to visualise different probabilistic 
outcomes in view of what might go wrong; given best case, 
worst case and most likely case scenarios.  
 
MC allows us to understand the outcome of scenarios and 
help to understand unexpected pattern without necessarily 
exposing information assets to real threats. The output of 
Monte Carlo simulation is a range of values and risk 
assessor can derive confidence level from that range. It is 
expected that predictive models will enable management to 
make more effective decisions, and be part of the analytical 
input for policy formation If there is a sound understanding 
of what might go wrong, decision makers can utilise the 
model to implements appropriate risk mitigation strategies 
and budget allocation for security investment.  
 
This study will be expanded as part of future work to 
include resource allocation for different information assets. 
A model that breaks down security budgets into fragments 
for further allocation, such that, information assets with the 
highest frequency and impact of threat events are allocated 
more resources than low impact events. 
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